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CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY
It’s Not What We Thought
Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army
Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand thecenter of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find
practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped
as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual
perspectives to Clausewitz’s expression and redefined it in its respective image.
Thus, the U.S. Marine Corps, a relatively small force designed more for win-
ning battles than fighting campaigns or wars, prefers to strike at enemy weak-
nesses. Accordingly, it initially equated enemy centers of gravity (CoGs) with
key vulnerabilities. Recently, however, Marine Corps doctrine has distinguished
between CoGs and critical vulnerabilities, considering them different but com-
plementary concepts; CoGs, for the Marines, are now
“any important sources of strength.”1
By comparison, the U.S. Air Force, which takes a
“targeting” approach to warfare, sees centers of grav-
ity as multiple strategic and operational critical points
that it can attack with its bombing assets. Airpower
theorists like John Warden, with his notion of “con-
centric rings,” have in fact identified so many CoGs as
to reduce the concept to absurdity.2
In contrast, the U.S. Army, which has the role
of fighting campaigns and winning wars, sees the
enemy’s center of gravity as his “source of strength.”3
Accordingly, the Army tends to look for a single center
of gravity, normally in the principal capability that
stands in the way of the accomplishment of its own
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mission. In short, the Army considers a “friendly” CoG as that element—a char-
acteristic, capability, or locality—that enables one’s own or allied forces to ac-
complish their objectives. Conversely, an opponent’s CoG is that element that
prevents friendly forces from accomplishing their objectives.
Likewise, the U.S. Navy, as America’s force for winning maritime wars, has a
center-of-gravity concept that resembles that of the Army and the Marines. Like
the Army, the Navy’s doctrine states that a “center of gravity is something the en-
emy must have to continue military operations—a source of his strength, but
not necessarily strong or a strength in itself. There can only be one center of
gravity.”4 Like the Marine Corps, the service it supports most, the Navy has made
the linkage between CoGs and vulnerabilities more explicit.5
Recently the Joint Staff ’s Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0)
attempted—with only limited success—to pull these various perspectives to-
gether into a single definition. Joint doctrine currently asserts that the essence of
the operational art—a term that Clausewitz would not have used—rests in be-
ing able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power, or centers of grav-
ity, to gain a decisive advantage.6 The Joint Staff now defines centers of gravity as
those “characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force de-
rives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”7 At the strategic
level, they can include a military force, an alliance, national will or public sup-
port, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself. At the
operational level, they are generally the principal sources of combat power—such
as combat forces that are modern, mobile, or armored—that can ensure, or pre-
vent, accomplishment of the mission. At its core, this definition is capabilities
based, despite the presence of terms such as “national will”and “public support.”
On this view, all elements—whether leadership, national will, or public opin-
ion—tend to flow from an opponent’s capability to resist.
However, this capabilities-based definition differs substantially from
Clausewitz’s own concept, which is effects based. To be sure, the U.S. military is
under no obligation to accept a concept developed nearly two centuries ago by a
military theorist who was influenced by a long-disappeared cultural environ-
ment and used conceptual tools quite different from those available today. Yet
each of the services believes that its definition of the center of gravity derives
from Clausewitz’s. Presumably the original concept had some special value that
attracted each of the services in the first place. That fascination is not misplaced;
the concept does have value. Unfortunately, the U.S. military’s misinterpreta-
tions of Clausewitz’s original idea have obscured it.
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CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY
The quintessential “cerebral savage,” Clausewitz borrowed a number of intellec-
tual constructs, theories, and concepts from the leading philosophers, scientists,
and other thinkers of his day in order to understand and describe what he ob-
served as the various aspects of war.8 Several of his concepts—friction, polarity,
and center of gravity—are analogies or metaphors drawn from the “mechanical
sciences” (today’s physics). In particular, the original German text of Vom Kriege
(On War) reveals that Clausewitz used the center-of-gravity metaphor—
expressed primarily as Schwerpunkt (center of gravity, or main point)—more
than fifty times.9 He appears to have derived his military concept of a center of
gravity after hearing a series of lectures by the German physicist Paul Erman, a
professor at the University of Berlin and the Prussian Allgemeine Kriegsschule
(war college). Clausewitz served as director of the war college from 1818 to 1830;
he and Erman knew each other cordially.10
Clausewitz’s use of the center of gravity in On War remains essentially consis-
tent with the concept’s representation in the mechanical sciences. Most English-
language sources that cite his definition of a center of gravity draw primarily
from one of two passages—pages 485–86 in Book VI (“Defense”), or pages
595–96 in Book VIII (“War Plans”), from the translation of On War by Sir
Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Unfortunately, that translation, while perhaps
the best available, is somewhat misleading. For one thing, it strips away the phys-
ics metaphors that Clausewitz used to describe his military concept, metaphors
essential to understanding his basic idea. Furthermore, it creates the false im-
pression that centers of gravity derive from “sources” of strength, or that they are
themselves “strengths.” Clausewitz never used the word “source” (Quelle) in this
connection, and he never directly equated the center of gravity to a strength or
source of strength. Finally, the Howard-Paret translation makes Clausewitz’s
concept appear static, bereft of the intrinsic dynamism he appears to have
envisioned.
This article will offer alternative translations of select passages that come
closer to Clausewitz’s original sense:
It is against that part of the enemy’s forces where they are most concentrated that, if a
blow were to occur, the effect would emanate the furthest; furthermore, the greater
the mass our own forces possess when they deliver the blow, the more certain we can
be of the blow’s success. This simple logic brings us to an analogy that enables us to
grasp the idea more clearly, namely, the nature and effect of a center of gravity in the
mechanical sciences.11
Since in this passage Clausewitz introduces the analogy in a theoretical sense,
it is appropriate to review how a center of gravity functions in elementary
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physics. In general, a center of gravity represents the point where the forces of
gravity can be said to converge within an object, the spot at which the object’s
weight is balanced in all directions. Striking at or otherwise upsetting the center
of gravity can cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall to the
ground. A physical object can be
thought of in two ways: as a composite
of many smaller particles, each of which
is acted upon by gravity; or as a single
object, acted upon by gravity only at a
single point (see figure 1).12 Under-
standably, physicists prefer the latter,
since it makes other calculations con-
cerning the interaction of force and
matter much easier. However, physicists
also acknowledge that a center of grav-
ity amounts to little more than a mathe-
matical approximation, since gravity
acts simultaneously upon all the points
in an object.
Calculating the center of gravity for a simple, symmetrical object—a yard-
stick, a marble, or a boomerang—is not difficult. The center of gravity of a
yardstick is at its middle; the CoG of a sphere lies at its geometric center.
Interestingly, the center of gravity of a boomerang, as can be readily calcu-
lated, lies not on the object itself but in
the V-shaped space between the arms
(see figure 2).13 Calculating the center
of gravity of more complex objects—
such as human beings, with many mov-
ing parts—is more difficult. Such ob-
jects must be artificially frozen in time
and space; if their distribution of
weight or position changes, or external
weight is added, the CoG moves. For ex-
ample, a soldier standing at port arms
will normally have a CoG in the middle
of the pelvis, roughly behind the navel
(see figure 3). If the soldier raises his
arms, his center of gravity rises to a
point somewhere behind and above the navel. If the soldier dons a rucksack, the
CoG will shift again. If he begins to move about rapidly, the center of gravity will
E C H E V A R R I A 1 1 1
FIGURE 1
CROSS SECTION OF A ROCK, SHOWING
HOW FORCES OF GRAVITY OPERATE
Adapted from Jones, Jones, and Marchington,
Cambridge Coordinated Science: Physics
FIGURE 2
CoG OF A BOOMERANG
Adapted from Jones, Jones, and Marchington,
Cambridge Coordinated Science: Physics
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change just as rapidly (see figure 4). If he becomes locked in hand-to-hand com-
bat, the gravitational forces acting on both bodies will affect the CoG of each. A
physicist could treat both masses as one and calculate a
common center of gravity of the total mass; however, if
the struggle proceeds at a rapid pace, the CoG will
change constantly.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the soldier’s center of
gravity is not a source of strength. Rather, it represents
the point of confluence where gravitational forces come
together. A soldier’s strength (or power) might derive
from muscles, brains, weapons, or any combination of
these—all of which relate to the center of gravity only so
far as the soldier needs balance to use them. Nor, strictly
speaking, is a center of gravity a weakness. A soldier
might lack physical strength, be “intellectually chal-
lenged,” or not have the proper weapons; these condi-
tions would constitute weaknesses, but they have little to do with the soldier’s
CoG, per se. Nonetheless, although neither a weakness nor a vulnerability, a cen-
ter of gravity can lie open to attack and, therefore, be vulnerable.
Clausewitz pursues the analogy:
Just as [in physics] the center of gravity is always found where the mass is most con-
centrated, and just as every blow directed against the body’s center of gravity yields
the greatest effect, and—moreover—the strongest blow is the one achieved by the
center of gravity, the same is true in war. The armed forces of
every combatant, whether an individual state or an alliance of
states, have a certain unity and thus a certain interdependence
or connectivity [Zusammenhang]; and just where such inter-
dependence exists, one can apply the center of gravity con-
cept. Accordingly, there exist within these armed forces
certain centers of gravity that, by their movement and direc-
tion, exert a decisive influence over all other points; and these
centers of gravity exist where the forces are most concen-
trated. However, just as in the world of inanimate bodies
where the effect on a center of gravity has its proportions and
limits determined by the interdependence of the parts, the
same is true in war.14
The previous two passages, as Clausewitz men-
tioned, serve only to introduce the basic theoretical
concept. Hence, we should take the description of the center of gravity in a met-
aphorical rather than a literal sense. Unfortunately, U.S. military analysts and
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A STATIONARY SOLDIER’S CoG
FIGURE 4
A MOVING SOLDIER’S CoG
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doctrine writers have failed to do that, preferring instead to interpret
Clausewitz’s center of gravity literally, as a concentration of force.
These passages reveal two important points. First, the CoG concept only ap-
plies where a certain “unity” (Einheit) and “connectivity” or “interdependence”
(Zusammenhang) exist between the enemy’s forces and the space they occupy.
The type and number of centers of gravity the enemy possesses will thus depend
upon the degree of connectivity, or overall unity, that his forces possess.15 Sec-
ond, Clausewitz’s statement that the center of gravity lies “where the forces are
most concentrated” refers less to the forces than to the thing that causes them to
be concentrated. As in the mechanical sciences, Clausewitz’s military CoG is a
focal point. Hence, combat forces tend to concentrate there and, at times, to ema-
nate from there.
In Book II, chapter 5 (“Critical Analysis”), Clausewitz uses an example
that clarifies this point. In the course of illustrating the importance of critical
analysis, he argues that the then-common opinion about Napoleon’s “Bril-
liant February” campaign of 1814 was wrong.16 Napoleon, confronted by
advancing Prussian and Austrian forces, first defeated Field Marshal Gebhard
von Blücher’s Prussian army, then turned on Field Marshal Karl Philip
Schwarzenberg’s Austrians and drove them back. However, Napoleon failed to
achieve a decisive victory in either case; his enemies were able to recover and de-
feat him a month later, eventually forcing him into exile. Clausewitz maintains
that instead of pursuing two (incomplete) victories, Napoleon should have con-
tinued hammering Blücher until the Prussian force was decisively defeated.
“Blücher,” he maintains, “although weaker [numerically] than Schwarzenberg,
was nonetheless the more important [adversary] due to his enterprising spirit;
hence, the center of gravity lay more with him [Blücher] and it pulled the others
in his direction.”17 In Clausewitz’s view, decisively defeating Blücher—the alli-
ance’s center of gravity—would have induced the Austrians to withdraw as well.
This example shows that the CoG concept refers less to the concentrated
forces than to the thing—in this case, Blücher—that causes them to concentrate
and gives them purpose and direction.18 Clausewitz also states that centers of
gravity have a “sphere of effectiveness” and that their “advance or retreat” can
have an effect “upon the rest” of the forces involved.19 As they advance or with-
draw across the battlefield, centers of gravity can “pull” friendly forces with
them, as Blücher would have. In other words, to return to the physics analogy,
military centers of gravity possess a certain centripetal (as opposed to centrifu-
gal) force. Accordingly, they represent in Clausewitz’s mind much more than a
mere concentration of forces. Indeed, his concept in general reflects an intrinsic
dynamism—not easy to capture on paper but conveyed by the analogy in chap-
ter 1, Book I, of a pendulum actively oscillating among three magnets.20
E C H E V A R R I A 1 1 3
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In Book VIII (“War Plans”), Clausewitz discusses the relevance of centers of
gravity to war planning. Contrary to some of his critics, Clausewitz does not
overextend the analogy by suggesting that several CoGs could exist beyond the
enemy army.21 In fact, the opposite is true. Book VI adheres almost too closely to
the physics analogy, at the expense of clarity as to military relevance. Book VIII
addresses that relevance and reveals the inherent flexibility of the concept:
What theory can admit to thus far is the following: Everything depends upon keeping
the dominant conditions of both states in mind. From these emerge a certain center
of gravity, a focal point of force and movement, upon which the larger whole de-
pends; and, it is against the enemy’s center of gravity that the collective blow of all
power must be directed. . . .
Small things always depend on large ones, the unimportant on the important, the in-
cidental on the essential. This relationship must guide our thoughts. . . .
Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII of Sweden, and Frederick
the Great each had their centers of gravity in their respective armies. Had their ar-
mies been destroyed, these men would have been remembered as failures. In states
with many factions vying for power, the center of gravity lies mainly in the capital; in
small states supported by a more powerful one, it lies in the army of the stronger
state; in alliances, it lies in the unity formed by common interests; in popular upris-
ings, it lies in the persons of the principal leaders and in public opinion. The blow
must be directed against these things. If the enemy loses his balance because of such a
blow, he must not be given time to regain it; blow after blow must follow in the same
manner. In other words, the victor must always direct all of his blows in such a way
that they will strike at the whole of the enemy, not just a part of him.22
This lengthy passage shows that the identity and location of a center of grav-
ity can be perceived only by considering the enemy holistically—that is, by
drawing connections between or among an adversary’s (or adversaries’) various
parts and then determining what “thing” holds them all together. For example,
the armies of Alexander, Gustavus, Charles XII, and Frederick were significant
not because they were “sources” of power but because they enabled their leaders
to hold their power systems together. In different circumstances, the personali-
ties of key leaders, a state’s capital, or the community of interests of a network of
allies perform this centripetal or centralizing function. The salient issue once
again is Zusammenhang—interdependence, or connectivity.
Clausewitz reinforced this point in chapter 9 of Book VIII, when he explains
that reducing the enemy’s force to one center of gravity depends “first, upon the
[enemy’s] political connectivity or unity itself”and “second, upon the situation in
the theater of war itself, and which of the various enemy armies appear there.”23
The criterion once again is the extent to which the enemy’s (or enemies’) forces
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can operate as a single entity. In World War I, Germany, fighting on two fronts,
had to look for two centers of gravity, one Anglo-French and one Russian.
Hence, the unity (or lack thereof) formed (or not) by military forces and the
geographical spaces in which they have to fight can create more than one CoG.24
Clausewitz, of course, advocates tracing these back to a single one, whenever
possible, but he allows for the possibility that no one, specific CoG might exist.
The key question, then, is whether the enemy is so “connected” that actions
against him in one area will have a decisive effect in other areas as well.25
AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH
Clausewitz’s center of gravity, then, is a “focal point,” neither a strength (or even
a source of one) nor a weakness, per se. Second, CoGs are found only where suf-
ficient connectivity exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an over-
arching system (or structure) that acts with a substantial degree of unity, like a
physical body. Third, a center of gravity exerts a certain centripetal force that
tends to hold an entire system or structure together; thus a blow at the center of
gravity would throw an enemy off balance or even cause the entire system (or
structure) to collapse. Fourth, using the concept necessitates viewing the enemy
holistically.
The U.S. military’s various definitions lack entirely Clausewitz’s sense of
“unity” or “connectivity.” By overlooking this essential prerequisite, the U.S.
military assumes centers of gravity exist where none might—the enemy may not
have sufficient connectivity between its parts to have a CoG. In that case the
analysis does little more than focus on the most critical of the enemy’s
capabilities.
As previously mentioned, Clausewitz’s CoG concept focuses on achieving a
specific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is an effects-based approach
rather than a capabilities-based one. In this sense, it resembles the emerging
concept of “effects-based operations” (EBO) more than the U.S. military’s
capabilities-based concept of CoG, with the exception that it seeks only one
particular effect—total collapse of the enemy.26 EBO has the benefit, as General
Anthony Zinni (U.S. Marine Corps, retired) has remarked, of forcing political
and military planners to focus on the specific effects that they want military
(and nonmilitary) action to achieve.27 Effects-based operations have been char-
acterized as dissolving “the glue” that holds a table together, rather than striking
at its individual legs.28 By implication, then, if Clausewitz’s CoG assumes the en-
emy constitutes a system, EBO goes a step farther and posits that the enemy is a
mappable system.
Like effects-based operations, Clausewitz’s center of gravity concept requires
the ability to predict, with reasonable accuracy, how at least first and second-
E C H E V A R R I A 1 1 5
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order effects, and possibly more, can be achieved. That said, it is important to
point out that Clausewitz considered the calculation of a CoG a matter of “stra-
tegic judgment” (strategische Urteil), to be addressed at the highest levels.29 It is
doubtful that he would have approved of current efforts to develop prescriptive
formulae.
Furthermore, Clausewitz’s CoGs were “operative” (wirksame) only in cam-
paigns or wars designed to defeat the enemy completely.30 In such wars, military
and political objectives are essentially complementary. In limited wars, on the
other hand, CoGs (because they by definition relate to the total collapse of the
enemy) tend to compete with political objectives. Notwithstanding, U.S. joint
doctrine asserts or implies that CoGs exist for all kinds and at all levels of war.31
Presumably, there are tactical centers of gravity, the defeat of which facilitates
the accomplishment of tactical objectives, which in turn contribute to the defeat
of operational CoGs, the destruction of which assists in the accomplishment of
operational objectives, and so on, until national security objectives are achieved.
Yet to insert a center of gravity into the strategic planning process is con-
trived and unnecessary. In the Gulf War (1990–91), for example—a limited
conflict in which, according to Clausewitz, the CoG concept should not have
been applied—the regional commander’s notion of the enemy’s center of
gravity did not accord with those of the joint force air component commander.
The former saw three distinct CoGs: Saddam Hussein, the Republican Guard,
and the Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear infrastructure. The air com-
mander identified twelve “target sets” ranging from national leadership and
command and control to railroads, airfields, and ports, each of them consti-
tuting a center of gravity. As Lieutenant Colonel Joe Purvis, who headed a team
of U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies graduates who assisted in
ground-component planning during the war, later admitted, “The
CENTCOM [Central Command, the regional command] staff became more
focused on what [the CoG] was as opposed to what do we do with it.”32 How-
ever, even simply translating the war’s strategic objectives—expulsion of Iraqi
forces from Kuwait and reduction of Iraqi offensive capability—into opera-
tional and tactical objectives would still have identified the capabilities that
coalition forces had to defeat in order to be successful.33
Clausewitz was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, and his emphasis on con-
centrating forces and energy for a knockout blow derived from his observations
that such concentrations often brought about success. He had obvious concerns
about the temptation to fritter away resources on ventures that would not bring
about a decisive end. These concerns were well placed. For one thing, the army
officers of his day were not the school-trained professionals of today; compe-
tence varied considerably. In addition, the operational art was not well
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developed; there were, for example, no standardized principles of war, such as
mass and objective, to encourage commanders to focus their efforts.
Today, military commanders concern themselves less with massing forces
than with massing effects. Nonetheless, joint doctrine still maintains that the
purpose of identifying a center of gravity is to assist commanders in focusing
their efforts and resources, just as in Clausewitz’s day. As Brigadier General Wass
de Czege (U.S. Army, retired) has explained, “Trying to approach the problem
from the perspective of a center of gravity leads you to see very quickly that some
vulnerabilities are interesting but a waste of resources because they do not lead
anywhere useful in the end.”34 At the same time, joint doctrine acknowledges
that CoGs may not always be readily discernible and that they can change at any
moment during an operation. If this is true, then why, as civilian analysts like
Eliot Cohen have asked, should the U.S. military bother with them?35 Joint doc-
trine’s answer is to insist that both enemy and friendly centers of gravity be ana-
lyzed continuously throughout an operation. However, this solution works only
if planning processes can keep pace with change and if political and military
leaders have the flexibility to redirect their efforts in midstream.
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
As this article has argued, the U.S. military has long misunderstood Clausewitz’s
concept of center of gravity, believing that its own capabilities-based definitions
are closely linked to his effects-based one. Ultimately, capabilities-based defini-
tions merely reflect back what each of the services wants to believe about its own
strengths and weaknesses and about those of its potential adversaries. Perhaps
that is why no single, reliable method for determining a center of gravity has
emerged after two decades of effort.36
Confusion has fallen equally upon those wishing to pursue the concept and
those who would abandon it.37 The question arises, in fact, of whether attempt-
ing to understand Clausewitz is worth the effort. Do his ideas in general, and
those related to the center of gravity in particular, offer anything of enduring
value to the strategist or the warfighter today?
As others have pointed out, many of Clausewitz’s ideas possess a transcen-
dent quality that makes them relevant not only to his era but always.38 These en-
during insights include friction in war, the culmination of the attack, and the
roles of chance and uncertainty. The center of gravity is another. The idea offers
something worthwhile for twenty-first-century strategists and warfighters.
However, its application must be judicious. The center of gravity needs to be
redefined as a “focal point,” not as a strength (or a weakness) or a source of
strength. A CoG is more than a critical capability; it is the point where a certain
centripetal force seems to exist, something that holds everything else together.
10
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For example, al-Qa‘ida cells might operate globally, but they are united by their
hatred of apostasy.39 This hatred, not Osama bin Laden, is their CoG. They ap-
parently perceive the United States and its Western values as the enemy CoG
(though they do not use the term) in their war against “apostate” Muslim lead-
ers. Decisively defeating al-Qa‘ida will involve neutralizing its CoG, but this will
require the use of diplomatic and informational initiatives more than military
action.
Commanders and their staffs need to identify where the connections—and
the gaps—exist in the enemy’s system as a whole before deciding whether a cen-
ter of gravity exists. The CoG concept does not apply if enemy elements are not
connected sufficiently. In other words, successful antiterrorist operations in Af-
ghanistan may not cause al-Qa‘ida cells in Europe or Singapore to collapse. In-
deed, given the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-explosive weapons that is expected to occur over the next decade or so, it is
dangerous to assume that all the segments of the enemy can be defeated by a sin-
gle knockout blow. Indeed, the continued proliferation of such weapons could
very well make the CoG concept academic.
Nor should the notion of a center of gravity be applied to every kind of war or
operation; if it is, the term may become overused and meaningless or be con-
flated with political-military objectives. The war against terrorism—and
al-Qa‘ida in particular—is a war to the death; hence, it is the kind of war in
which the CoG approach serves a constructive purpose. The Gulf War of
1990–91 was not.
The industrial-age paradigm of warfare, in which the distinction between the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels is inviolate, needs to be replaced with
one that regards all activities of war as interdependent. Clausewitz did not dis-
tinguish between tactical, operational, or strategic centers of gravity; he defined
the center of gravity holistically—that is, by the entire system (or structure) of
the enemy—not in terms of level of war.
The American military—with the help of a somewhat misleading transla-
tion—has obscured the true sense of Clausewitz’s center of gravity, but it can
still adjust its doctrine to correct those errors. If it does not, the concept will cre-
ate more confusion and cost more than it is worth. The U.S. military would do
better to abandon the center of gravity concept altogether than to apply it in cir-
cumstances and ways not appropriate to it. The risks of misapplying it, espe-
cially in an environment in which opponents can operate in a wholly
decentralized manner but with potentially devastating power, are too great.
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